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Notes
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION v. BURWELL:
CORRECTLY CHOOSING BUT ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN MANDAMUS RELIEF CONCERNING
AGENCY NONCOMPLIANCE
MICHAEL L. LABATTAGLIA ∗
In American Hospital Association v. Burwell, 1 the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia considered whether to compel
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to conduct
Medicare reimbursement hearings that had not occurred within a ninety-day
statutory deadline.2 Plaintiff hospitals awaiting their hearings for far longer
than ninety days sought mandamus relief; a judicial remedy to direct HHS
to conduct the hearings in compliance with the statutory deadline.3 Unlike
some courts in other federal circuits, courts in the D.C. Circuit do not
automatically issue mandamus relief whenever an agency does not comply
with a statutory deadline.4 Accordingly, the district court employed a
discretionary test to evaluate whether mandamus relief was appropriate
based on individualized factors of the case.5 In applying the test in this
case, the district court denied mandamus relief.6
This Note will support the D.C. Circuit’s use of a discretionary
balancing test but argues that the district court erroneously balanced the
© 2016 Michael L. LaBattaglia.
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1. 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 48.
4. Id. at 50; see infra Part II.B.
5. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 50.
6. Id. at 56.

1066

LaBattagliaFinalBookProof

2016]

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION v. BURWELL

4/21/2016 8:55 AM

1067

relevant factors. 7 On one side of the scale, the district court allowed its
strict posture of deference toward agency policymaking to bias the scale too
heavily against mandamus relief. 8 On the other side, the court overlooked
or minimized critical facts favoring mandamus relief, such as Congress’s
purpose for the statutory deadline and specific instances in the plaintiffs’
pleadings demonstrating the deleterious effect of HHS’s noncompliance on
human health and welfare. 9 This Note will explain, moreover, that the
district court’s decision illustrates the problematic void created when strict
deference doctrine prevents courts from exercising reasonable discretion in
protecting certain legal rights while the other branches of government lack
forthcoming remedies to address the issue. 10
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed and remanded the district court’s decision. 11 The
remand order instructed the district court to include and reconsider certain
factors in the balancing test, and reminded the district court of its ultimate
obligation to enforce the law as intended by Congress. 12 The remand order
instructions substantiate points argued in this Note and underscore the
conclusion that the district court should have issued mandamus relief in the
first instance of deciding the case. 13
I. THE CASE
Health care providers that furnish services to Medicare patients receive
payment from HHS through an administrative process. 14 Providers begin
this administrative process by first submitting reimbursement claims to a
Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”).15 Providers may appeal a
MAC’s claim denial by requesting that the MAC conduct a redetermination
of the claim within sixty days of filing. 16 If the MAC denies the claim for a
second time, providers may then appeal to a Qualified Independent
Contractor (“QIC”). 17 The QIC reviews the MAC’s redetermination within

7. See infra Part IV.A–B.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 196–201.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part IV.C.
11. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016). This Note was
selected for publication prior to the decision on Feb. 9, 2016 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversing the decision of the district court.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see infra Part IV.
14. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183,
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (referring to the four-step administrative process detailed in 42 U.S.C
§ 1395ff (2012)).
15. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395kk–1(a)(1)–(4), 1395ff(a)(2)(A)).
16. Id. (citing § 1395ff(a)(3)).
17. Id.
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sixty days. 18 Providers who are not satisfied with the QIC’s decision may
request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 19 The ALJ
provides the only guarantee in the Medicare appeals process that appellants
will receive a formal, on-the-record hearing during which they can present
evidence and testimony. 20 ALJs are statutorily required to issue a decision
within ninety days from the time appellants request a hearing. 21 A provider
may appeal an ALJ’s decision to the Departmental Appeals Board
(“DAB”), the final level of review within HHS. 22 The DAB is required to
issue a decision within ninety days. 23 Providers may appeal DAB decisions
to federal court. 24 Providers may bypass levels of review through a process
commonly called “escalation” if either the QIC, ALJ, or DAB is unable to
issue a decision by its statutory deadline.25
In recent years, the appeals process has backlogged at the ALJ level
due to an unprecedented volume of claims submitted on appeal.26 ALJs are
unable to issue decisions within the statutorily required ninety-day
timeline. 27 The DAB, although to a lesser degree than the ALJs, is also
receiving more appeals than it can process and will not likely meet the
ninety-day deadline for issuing decisions in most appeals.28
The plaintiffs in this case, hospitals serving Medicare patients, have
reimbursement claims backlogged at the ALJ hearing level that were not
resolved within the ninety-day statutory timeframe and will likely remain in
the appeals process for years. 29 Plaintiffs have exhausted the first two
levels of the Medicare appeals process and, meanwhile, await the
opportunity to present their case for reimbursement before an ALJ. 30
Facing financial losses from the nearly 2000 backlogged appeals, worth
more than $10 million, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary of HHS to demand
the timely adjudication of their appeals. 31

18. Id. (citing § 1395ff(c)).
19. Id. (citing §§ 1395ff(b)(1)(E)(i), (d)(1)(A)).
20. Id. at 48 (explaining that the ALJ level is the first, and only, guaranteed opportunity for
appellants to provide oral testimony within the administrative appeals process).
21. Id. at 46 (citing § 1395ff(d)(1)(a)).
22. Id. (citing § 1395ff(d)(2)).
23. Id. at 47.
24. Id. at 46 (citing §§ 405.980, 405.1130).
25. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 46.
27. Id. at 47. Since 2013, HHS has suspended assigning new provider-based claims to ALJs.
Medicare beneficiaries, who are served by the same appeals process, continue to have their claims
assigned to ALJs. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id. at 45.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A court’s parameters for compelling agency action when that agency
misses a statutory deadline are discernable in the following discussion.32
Part II.A of this Note outlines the authority that permits a court to direct an
agency to act. 33 Part II.B analyzes the various ways in which courts have
treated the issue of whether to compel agency action when an agency
misses a statutory deadline. 34
A. Courts May Compel Agency Action When an Agency Fails to Act
Courts may compel agencies to act when agencies fail to perform their
official duties. 35 Part II.A.1 explains the Writ of Mandamus as a
mechanism for federal courts to order government agencies to act.36 Part
II.A.2 discusses the judicial review provisions within the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) that allow courts to issue mandamus relief against
federal agencies that fail to perform their official duties.37 Part II.A.3
examines how courts approach mandamus relief when agencies do not
comply with deadlines contained in their enabling statutes.38
1. Writ of Mandamus
A Writ of Mandamus is a judicial vehicle for a federal court to order a
government agency to perform a required act. 39 Specifically, a mandamus
action empowers a court “to compel an officer or employee of the United
States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”40 The
United States Supreme Court recognizes that a party seeking mandamus
relief must demonstrate that they have been deprived of a clear and
indisputable right. 41 The Court has also explained that “mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.” 42
Finally, the Supreme Court recognizes that granting mandamus relief is a
matter of discretion with the reviewing court. 43

32. See infra Part II.A–B.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.A.1.
37. See infra Part II.A.2.
38. See infra Part II.A.3.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988)
(outlining the pleading requirements for mandamus relief).
42. Id. at 289.
43. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).

LaBattagliaFinalBookProof

1070

4/21/2016 8:55 AM

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:1066

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia uses a
three-prong standard for plaintiffs pleading mandamus relief. 44 Plaintiffs in
the D.C. Circuit courts must plead that they have “a clear right to relief,”
that the agency “has a clear duty to act,” and that there is “no other adequate
remedy available to plaintiff.” 45 Regarding the final prong, the remedy
must be either unavailable or inadequate rather than merely reflect a
plaintiff’s preference for one form of remedy over another.46 Moreover,
courts in the D.C. Circuit may decline to issue mandamus relief at their
discretion even when a plaintiff meets the pleading standard, especially in
matters of complex bargaining between the coordinate branches of
government. 47 For example, in National Wildlife Federation v. United
States, 48 the D.C. Circuit declined to issue mandamus relief when it
involved “intrud[ing]” into complex federal budget matters that were best
left to the legislative and executive branches. 49
2. Administrative Procedures Act
The judicial review provisions of the APA provide a framework for
courts to use mandamus relief when agencies do not perform their official
duties. 50 Section 701(6) states: “The reviewing court shall compel agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . . .” 51 Judicial review
is precluded by Section 701(a)(2) to the extent that “agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.” 52 Finally, Section 702 states:
“Nothing herein . . . affects other limitations on judicial review or the power
or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other
appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .” 53
Two Supreme Court cases clarify, to some degree, the APA’s judicial
review provisions concerning mandamus relief. In the first case, Norton v.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”), 54 the Court announced, “the
only agency action that can be compelled under the APA is covered in
Section 706(1)’s mandate for courts to compel agency action “unlawfully

44. Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 787.
47. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208, 212 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that
even when a duty is clear and indisputable, issuance of writ of mandamus is committed to the
discretion of the court).
48. 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
49. Id. at 924
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1) (2012).
51. Id. § 706(1) (internal numbering omitted).
52. Id. § 701(a)(2).
53. Id. § 702 (internal numbering omitted).
54. 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004).
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withheld.” 55 Justice Scalia briefly distinguished action “unreasonably
delayed” in a footnote; “Of course, [Section] 706(1) also authorizes courts
to ‘compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed’—but a delay cannot be
unreasonable with respect to action that is not required.” 56 Justice Scalia’s
footnote bifurcates Section 706(1) and arguably weakens the mandate for a
court to compel agency action that is “unreasonably delayed.” 57 In the
second case, Heckler v. Chaney,58 the Court limited the extent to which
Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of agency action that is
committed to agency discretion by law. 59 The Court held that matters of
agency discretion covered by Section 701(a)(2) enjoy a presumption against
judicial review but are not totally immune from judicial review.60 The
Court explained, “the presumption [of unreviewability in the APA] may be
rebutted where the [enabling] statute has provided guidelines for the agency
to follow.” 61
3. Enabling Statute
Specific commands from Congress in the enabling statute may rebut
the presumption of unreviewability within Section 701(a)(2) and thereby
allow a court to issue mandamus relief even when the action is committed
to agency discretion.62 The Heckler Court stressed the importance of the
specific language in the enabling statute by explaining, “Congress may limit
an agency’s exercise of . . . power if it wishes, either by setting substantive
priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.” 63 The Heckler Court
added, “Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction
in the statutory scheme that the agency administers.” 64 Justice Marshall, in
concurrence, addressed the role courts have in balancing deference to
agencies and issuing mandamus relief, stating:
[R]ecognizing that courts must approach the substantive task of
reviewing such failures [to meet statutory requirements] with
appropriate deference to an agency’s legitimate need to set policy
through the allocation of scarce budgetary and enforcement
resources. . . . [T]he Court’s approach, if taken literally, would

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 63 n.1.
Id.
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
See id. at 832 (interpreting § 701(a)(2) of the APA).
Id.
Id. at 832–33.
Id.
Id. at 833.
Id.
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take the courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far
too many cases . . . . 65
B. The Federal Circuits Are Split on When to Compel Action for
Agency Non-Compliance with a Statutory Deadline
A split exists among the federal circuit courts regarding whether to
automatically issue mandamus relief when an agency misses a statutory
deadline. 66 Part II.B.1 examines decisions from federal circuit courts that
interpret missed statutory deadlines as action “unlawfully withheld” under
Section 706(1). 67 As such, these courts interpret the phrase “shall compel
agency action” in Section 706(1) as mandating a court to issue mandamus
relief. 68 In contrast, Part II.B.2 analyzes decisions from federal courts,
including the D.C. Circuit, that interpret missed statutory deadlines as
action “unreasonably delayed” under Section 706(1).69 Under this
framework, courts interpret the phrase “shall compel agency action” as
providing discretion, rather than a mandate, for determining whether to
issue mandamus relief. 70
1. Interpreting Section 706(1) of the APA as Requiring Courts to
Issue Mandamus Relief When an Agency Misses a Statutory
Deadline
Some federal circuit courts interpret a missed statutory deadline as
“agency action unlawfully withheld” under Section 706(1). 71 As such,
noncompliance with a statutory deadline serves as a per se violation of the
APA. 72 For example, in Tenth Circuit jurisprudence, Forrest Guardians v.
Babbitt 73 demonstrates that agency action is “unlawfully withheld” when an
agency fails to meet “a statutorily imposed absolute deadline.” 74 Similarly,
in the Ninth Circuit case, Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Badgley, 75 the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 855 (Marshall, J., concurring).
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text; see also DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43013, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND CLAIMS OF UNREASONABLE
DELAY: ANALYSIS OF COURT TREATMENT 7 (2013) (identifying that various lower courts make a
distinction between actions unlawfully withheld and actions unreasonably delayed).
72. SHEDD, supra note 71.
73. 174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (determining that failure to comply with a statutorily
imposed absolute deadline constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld).
74. Id. at 1190.
75. 309 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2002).
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court held that a missed statutory deadline violates the “clear congressional
intent” and “frustrate[s] the policy Congress sought to implement.” 76
Federal courts that interpret a missed statutory deadline as “action
unlawfully withheld” often strictly interpret the Section 706(1) phrase
“shall compel agency action” to require mandamus relief.77 As such, these
courts automatically issue mandamus relief without discretion.78 For
example, in Forrest Guardians, the Tenth Circuit held that “when an entity
governed by the APA fails to comply with a statutorily imposed absolute
deadline . . . courts, upon proper application, must compel the agency to
act.” 79 In Badgley, the Ninth Circuit held that an agency’s “failure to [act]
within the mandated time frame compelled the court to grant injunctive
relief . . . [with] no discretion to consider the [agency’s] stated priorities.” 80
2. Interpreting Section 706(1) of the APA as Permitting Judicial
Discretion to Issue Mandamus Relief When an Agency Misses a
Statutory Deadline
The D.C. Circuit departs from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in deciding
how to issue mandamus relief when an agency does not comply with its
statute. 81 Specifically, the D.C. Circuit interprets the phrase “shall compel
agency action” under Section 706(1) as permitting the court to use
discretion in deciding whether to issue mandamus relief.82 For example, the
D.C. District Court in Center for Biological Diversity v. Pirie 83 held that a
court is not required to compel agency action under Section 706(1)
“[d]espite language in the substantive provisions of the [statute] written in
mandatory terms.” 84 The D.C. Circuit based its discretionary interpretation
of Section 706(1) in the text of Section 702; “[b]ecause [Section] 702 of the
APA explicitly states that a court retains equitable discretion, this Court can
not hold that Congress has clearly and unequivocally limited that discretion
under the APA.” 85

76. Id. at 1175.
77. See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
79. 174 F.3d at 1190.
80. 309 F.3d at 1178.
81. Compare Forrest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1190 (interpreting § 706(1) of the APA as
mandating a court to issue mandamus relief), and Badgley, 309 F.3d at 1178 (same), with Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated as moot, Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, 2003 WL 179848, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003)
(criticizing the reasoning used by the Tenth Circuit in Forrest Guardians).
82. See text accompanying infra note 84.
83. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 119.
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In exercising the judicial discretion recognized in Sections 706(1) and
702, the D.C. Circuit uses a factor test to determine whether to issue
mandamus relief. 86 The D.C. Circuit categorizes a missed statutory
deadline as “unreasonably delayed” under Section 706(1) and will issue
mandamus relief when an agency’s delay is “so egregious as to warrant
mandamus.” 87 In Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC 88
(“TRAC”), the D.C. Circuit established a factor test (the “TRAC” test) to
determine when a delay is sufficiently egregious. 89 The TRAC test weighs
six factors. The court should first consider “the time agencies take to make
decisions must be governed by a rule of reason.” 90 Second, “where
Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory
scheme may supply content for this rule of reason.”91 The court will also
consider that “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic
regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake.” 92
The court should consider, fourth, “the effect of expediting delayed action
on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” 93 and, fifth, “the
nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay.” 94 Finally, the reason
for the delay must not be due to any impropriety. 95 In TRAC, the court
acknowledged that the factor test “is hardly ironclad, and sometimes suffers
from vagueness, [but] it nevertheless provides useful guidance in assessing
claims of agency delay.” 96
The D.C. Circuit has used the TRAC test with varied results depending
on the strength of certain factors. 97 Strong showings of the first two TRAC
86. See infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v.
FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
88. 750 F. 2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
89. Id. at 80 (establishing, but not applying, the factor test).
90. Id. (quoting Potomac Electric Power Company v. ICC (PEPCO), 702 F.2d 1026, 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1983); and then citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC (MCI), 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
91. Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34–35 (D.C. Cir.
1984); then citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158 n.30 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); and then citing PEPCO, 702 F.2d at 1034).
92. Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 34; then citing Auchter, 702
F.2d at 1157; and then citing Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 587
F.2d 329, 334 (6th Cir. 1978)).
93. Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 34; then citing Auchter, 702
F.2d at 1158).
94. Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 35).
95. Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 34).
96. Id. at 80.
97. Compare In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasizing TRAC
test factor number four to deny mandamus relief), with In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680
F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (emphasizing TRAC test factor number as “most important” in
granting mandamus relief).
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factors, which emphasize the importance of the deadline, weigh in favor of
mandamus relief. 98 For example, in In re People’s Mojahedin Organization
of Iran, 99 the D.C. Circuit court issued mandamus relief when it found that
a twenty-month failure to act on a 180-day statutory deadline “plainly
frustrate[d] the congressional intent and cut[] strongly in favor of granting
[the] mandamus petition.” 100 On the other hand, a strong showing of the
fourth TRAC factor, which favors agency autonomy and deference, has
traditionally made courts hesitant to use mandamus relief.101 For example,
in In re Barr Labs, 102 the D.C. district court determined that forcing the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to comply with a 180-day deadline
would inappropriately interfere with the deference Congress granted to
FDA to order its priorities. 103
The D.C. Circuit has provided guiding principles that assist in
evaluating the remaining TRAC factors. 104 Regarding the third and fifth
factors—which concern the interest in delays that might be less tolerable
when human health and welfare are at stake—the D.C. Circuit has
explained that human health and welfare are at stake when agencies delay in
action such as requiring Aspirin warning labels and regulating raw milk. 105
Regarding the sixth factor, the D.C. Circuit will not favor mandamus relief
where an agency shows “marked improvement in managing its docket, and
there is little reason to believe” a court order is “necessary to sustain that
improvement or . . . helpful in spurring greater effort.” 106
In a nearly identical case regarding mandamus relief decided shortly
after American Hospital Association v. Burwell, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held in Cumberland County
Hospital System v. Burwell 107 that a plaintiff-hospital did not adequately
plead a clear and indisputable right to an ALJ hearing. 108 The court
reasoned that Congress “set[] out escalation as an alternate course in the
98. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
99. 680 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
100. Id. at 837.
101. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
102. 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 75 (emphasizing TRAC test factor four in finding that a statutory deadline does not
necessarily serve as proxy for Congress’s intent to dictate agency priorities).
104. See generally Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (explaining each factor of the TRAC test).
105. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“All
scientific evidence in the record points to a link between salicylates and Reye’s Syndrome . . . .”);
see also Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1985) (“Officials at the highest
levels of the [agency] have concluded that certified raw milk poses a serious threat to the public
health.”).
106. See In re Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp., AFL-CIO, 837 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
107. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959,
at *6 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015).
108. See id. (denying mandamus relief without reaching the merits of the case).
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case of a delay . . . [and] therefore, expressly anticipated delays in Medicare
adjudications and prescribed escalation as the remedy.” 109 The court also
noted that had the plaintiffs been eligible for mandamus, the court would
have found that the particular circumstances did not merit mandamus relief
under a TRAC-like factor test. 110
In summation, specific direction from Congress within an agency’s
enabling statute provides a basis for a court to issue mandamus relief when
an agency does comply with that direction. 111 When that specific direction
from Congress is a statutory deadline, the federal circuits split as to how
they interpret and apply the relevant judicial review provisions of the APA
when an agency misses its deadline. 112 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
conclude, under Section 706(1), that agency action has been unlawfully
withheld and a court must issue mandamus relief.113 Alternatively, the D.C.
Circuit concludes, under Section 706(1), that agency action has been
delayed and a factor test is required to determine if the delay is so egregious
as to warrant mandamus relief.114
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In American Hospital Association v. Burwell, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia denied mandamus relief when
HHS failed to comply with a statutory deadline, holding that HHS’s delay
was “not so egregious as to warrant intervention” in the form of mandamus
relief. 115 In reaching the merits of the case, the district court followed the
D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudential position that an agency’s noncompliance with
a statutory deadline concerns agency delay rather than an agency’s refusal
to act. 116 As such, the district court considered whether HHS’s delay was
“so egregious” as to warrant mandamus relief.117 The district court noted
that D.C. Circuit jurisprudence provides “no per se rule as to how long is
too long” of a delay before a court should be compelled to issue mandamus
relief. 118 The district court applied the six-factor TRAC test to evaluate the
delay. 119
109. Id.
110. Id. at *7 n.5.
111. See supra Part II.A.1.
112. See supra Part II.A.2.
113. See supra Part II.B.1.
114. See supra Part II.B.2.
115. 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
116. Id. at 50 (quoting Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 705 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir.1992))).
119. Id.
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The district court first addressed TRAC factors one and two
concurrently in evaluating HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory
deadline. 120 The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that noncompliance
with a statutory deadline alone justified intervention, distinguishing the case
from People’s Mojahedin where the D.C. Circuit granted mandamus relief
in response to an agency’s failure to meet a statutory deadline.121 In
contrast, the court adopted the Secretary’s position that Barr Labs provided
the controlling authority, explaining that although “HHS has violated its
statutory framework, this conclusion ‘does not, alone, justify judicial
intervention.’” 122
Next, the district court concurrently examined TRAC factors three and
five, which concern the consequences of non-intervention to plaintiffs and
the public. 123 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the effect of
reimbursement delays—forcing hospitals to “reduce costs, eliminate jobs,
forego services, and substantially scale back” 124—have sufficiently harmed
patient health and welfare.125 The court, rather, found that the effects were
“real consequences to health and welfare, [but] . . . not the kind of
immediate and undisputed dangers that have weighed heavily in the TRAC
analysis in other cases.” 126 Moreover, the court noted, “[n]early everything
HHS does affects human health and welfare—and that context matters.” 127
As the D.C. Circuit explained in Sierra Club v. Thomas, 128 “[a]lthough this
court has required greater agency promptness as to actions involving
interests relating to human health and welfare, . . . this factor alone can
hardly be considered dispositive when, as in this case, virtually the entire
docket of the agency involves issues of this type.” 129 The court, therefore,
found that the third and fifth TRAC factors weighed “only very lightly in
favor of granting relief.” 130
The district court then considered TRAC factor four, which considers
the effect of mandamus relief on the agency’s competing priorities.131 The
court agreed with the Secretary’s comparison of her case to that of Barr
Labs, where the D.C. Circuit relied on TRAC factor four in denying
120. Id. at 51.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
123. Id. at 51–52.
124. Id. at 52.
125. Id.
126. Id. (contrasting the danger to public health caused by certified raw milk in Pub. Citizen v.
Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1985), with unlabeled aspirin in Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
127. Id.
128. 828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
129. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Sierra Club, 828 F.2d at 798).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 53.
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mandamus relief. 132 Similar to Barr Labs, the district court reasoned that
mandamus relief would impinge on the “autonomy and comparative
institutional advantage of the executive branch” by “assum[ing] command
over an agency’s choice of priorities.” 133 The district court noted that
mandamus relief in this case is “precisely the kind of conundrum the D.C.
Circuit has cautioned courts against trying to solve.”134 In short, the district
court concluded that mandamus relief “is not a license to intermeddle, and
the court is loath to horn in on the problem-solving efforts of the other two
branches of government.” 135
Finally, the district court evaluated the Secretary’s previous efforts in
addressing the backlog in the sixth and final factor of the TRAC test. 136
Under TRAC factor six, “the good faith of the agency in addressing the
delay weighs against mandamus.” 137 The district court identified good faith
in that HHS had “taken modest steps to increase ALJ work capacity: it is
moving to electronic processing, has added ALJs, provided support for
ALJs, and offered alternative adjudication options.” 138 The district court
simultaneously rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the Secretary’s
measures “[did] not establish good faith, considering the fact that even the
Secretary acknowledges that [these steps] will not solve the backlog
problem.” 139 The district court found, however, that the “agency’s efforts
do not offer a perfect resolution” but “move in the right direction,” enough
to weigh against mandamus. 140
The district court concluded its decision to deny mandamus relief by
noting that its “conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Congress is aware of
the situation and is in a position to address the problem.” 141 The district
court urged the Secretary and Congress to continue working together
toward a solution. 142 The district court further opined that “[h]ospitals that
are owed reimbursement should not be indefinitely deprived of funds” but
they must wait until the TRAC test factors shift in their favor. 143
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 54.
135. Id. at 54–55.
136. Id. at 55–56.
137. Id. at 56 (quoting Liberty Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C. 2005); In
re Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp., AFL–CIO, 837 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing mandamus
relief where the agency showed “marked improvement in managing its docket, and there [was]
little reason to believe” a court order was “necessary to sustain that improvement or . . . helpful in
spurring greater effort”)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In American Hospital Association v. Burwell, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held that HHS’s noncompliance
with a statutory ninety-day Administrative Law Judge hearing deadline did
not warrant mandamus relief.144 Part IV.A proposes that the district court
correctly interpreted the APA as allowing judicial discretion in deciding
whether to issue mandamus relief when HHS failed to comply with its
statutory deadline. 145 Part IV.B concludes that the district court erred,
however, in exercising its discretion by misapplying the TRAC factor test to
deny mandamus relief. 146 Instead, the district court should have granted
mandamus relief based on a strong showing of the TRAC factors indicating
that the delay was sufficiently “egregious.” 147 Part IV.C asserts that, as an
additional policy matter, the uncertainty of any forthcoming remedy from
HHS and Congress in addressing the delay further bolsters the argument for
mandamus relief. 148
A. The District Court Correctly Interpreted the APA to Allow Judicial
Discretion Regarding Whether to Issue Mandamus
The district court’s use of discretion regarding whether to issue
mandamus relief follows the correct interpretation of the APA.149 Part
IV.A.1 demonstrates that the phrase “shall compel” within Section 706(1)
allows for judicial discretion when considered within the context of
preceding sections. 150 Part IV.A.2 establishes that the district court
correctly analyzed HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory deadline under
the “unreasonably delayed” rather than “unlawfully withheld” framework,
as the former operates consistently within the judicial discretion inherent
within Section 706(1). 151
1.

The Phrase “Shall Compel” Allows for Judicial Discretion
Under Section 706(1) of the APA

The district court correctly concluded that Section 706(1) does not
mandate a court to issue mandamus relief. 152 The phrase “shall compel”
appears, on face value, to hamstring a court’s discretion whenever an

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.A.1–2.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
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agency misses a statutory deadline. 153 The argument for strictly construing
the word “shall” to create a mandate, indeed, begins and ends with the plain
meaning of Section 706(1). 154 The APA, however, should be interpreted
differently from ordinary statutes and requires a contextual reading. 155 A
contextual reading of the APA supports the district court’s decision to retain
discretion regarding whether to issue mandamus relief notwithstanding the
use of the word “shall” in Section 706(1). 156
The sections preceding Section 706(1) provide the contextual basis for
finding that a Section 706(1) violation does not necessarily create an
absolute mandate for a court to issue mandamus relief. 157 First, the
seemingly draconian “shall” provision of Section 706(1) is softened by the
Section 701(a)(2) requirement that a court must first analyze whether the
action is committed to agency discretion and, therefore, unreviewable in
court. 158 In other words, a court may chose not to review agency action if it
determines that Congress committed discretion to the agency. 159 Second,
Section 702 addresses judicial discretion by explaining, “[n]othing herein
affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court
to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or
equitable ground.” 160 Section 702 means that even if a court finds that an
agency’s action is reviewable, a court may exercise discretion to deny
mandamus relief for other reasons.161 A contextual reading, therefore,
reveals that the word “shall” within Section 706(1) is subject to the
discretionary provisions of the surrounding sections in the APA. 162

153. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012); see, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569–70 (1998)
(stating that “shall” is mandatory, not permissive, language); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S.
600, 607 (1989) (noting that “shall” is the strongest mandate Congress could possibly use).
154. See Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency
Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1571 (2001) (arguing that the
word “shall” indicates mandatory conduct).
155. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND.
L.J. 1207, 1250 (2015) (arguing that APA provisions require a contextual interpretation). Because
the APA was designed to apply broadly to all agencies without sufficient deliberation, courts
should interpret its provisions contextually and “adhere more closely to the compromises encoded
in the statute’s text.” Id. at 1211.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 157–162.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 157–162.
158. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012); see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)
(interpreting § 701(a)(2) as a rebuttable presumption of unreviewability of action committed to
agency discretion, rather than interpreting the Section strictly).
159. Id.
160. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (internal numbering omitted).
161. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2002),
vacated as moot, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, 2003 WL 179848, at *1
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (concluding that § 702 of the APA affords courts with discretion under §
706(1)).
162. Id.
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The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant APA provisions
lends support for a contextual interpretation that favors judicial
discretion. 163 The Court has concluded, as a general matter, that mandamus
is “an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.” 164
A reviewing court, therefore, has considerable discretion to decline judicial
intervention in ordinary situations. 165 Additionally, the Heckler Court
softened the seemingly strict language of the unreviewability provision in
Section 701(a)(2) by creating a rebuttable presumption, enabling a court to
intervene if a plaintiff can overcome the presumption of unreviewability. 166
The Court’s interpretations of the APA, therefore, support judicial
discretion even when the statute’s plain meaning appears to give a court
little room to maneuver. 167
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that mandamus relief
against HHS was not mandated. 168 The district court announced, “whether
mandamus relief should issue is discretionary.” 169 Without mentioning the
APA directly in its opinion, the district court followed the D.C. Circuit’s
statutory interpretation of Section 706(1).170 The D.C. Circuit’s statutory
interpretation correctly affords a court with the flexibility necessary to
examine Section 706(1) in light of Sections 701(a)(2) and 702.171
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 706(1) prevails on legal
soundness compared to that of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 172 The Ninth
Circuit concluded in Badgley that a missed statutory deadline “compelled
the court to grant . . . relief” and the “court had no discretion.”173 Similarly,
the Tenth Circuit concluded in Forrest Guardians that Congress imposed a
mandatory duty upon an agency when a statute uses the word “shall.” 174
163. See, e.g., Norton v. SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004) (finding that the principal purpose of
the APA limitations on judicial intervention is to protect agencies from undue interference from
courts); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (interpreting the APA to afford discretion to
courts in matters of agency immunity from judicial review).
164. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988).
165. Cf. id. (implying that courts have discretion to deny mandamus relief in ordinary
situations).
166. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33 (creating a rebuttable presumption against judicial
review rather than an absolute bar).
167. Id.
168. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183,
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see supra notes 158–167 and accompanying text.
169. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 49.
170. See id. at 50 (noting that issue concerned agency delay rather than a refusal to act).
171. See supra note 163; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113,
118 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated as moot, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, 2003
WL 179848, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (interpreting § 706(1) of the APA to afford courts
with judicial discretion).
172. See infra text accompanying notes 173–177.
173. 309 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 20001); see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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Critics of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence side with the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits in concluding that courts are duty-bound to force agencies to
comply with statutory deadlines because the plain meaning of the word
“shall” is a clear manifestation of Congress’s intent to remove discretion
from the courts. 175 Such a narrow reading of Section 706(1), however,
frustrates the context of the APA’s statutory scheme by reducing the
discretionary provision of Section 702 to surplusage. 176 Instead, the D.C.
Circuit’s use of a balancing test to determine whether to issue mandamus
relief harmonizes the seemingly inapposite provisions of the APA by
reading the discretionary provision of Section 702 to qualify rather than
contradict the language of Section 706(1).177
2.

Courts Should Analyze Missed Statutory Deadlines Under
Section 706(1) of the APA as “Unreasonably Delayed” Rather
Than “Unlawfully Withheld”

The district court correctly analyzed HHS’s noncompliance with its
statutory deadline under the “unreasonably delayed” rather than “unlawfully
withheld” framework of Section 706(1). 178 In Norton v. SUWA, the
Supreme Court infused Section 706(1) with additional judicial discretion by
concluding that agency action “unreasonably delayed” does not provide the
same basis for mandamus relief as agency action “unlawfully withheld.” 179
The Supreme Court’s bifurcation of Section 706(1) suggests that
designating action as “unlawfully withheld” provides less need for judicial
discretion, as the word “unlawfully” directly indicates illegal action. 180 In
contrast, designating agency action as “unreasonably delayed” appears to
invite judicial discretion in determining whether there is good reason for the
delay. 181 To read SUWA any other way is to assert the very unlikely
conclusion that the Supreme Court made a meaningless distinction when
bifurcating Section 706(1). 182 The “unreasonably delayed” framework,
therefore, affords a court with a significant amount of discretion to assess
the reasonableness of an agency’s delay when deciding whether to issue
mandamus relief. 183
175. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
176. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (rendering meaningless the discretion noted in § 702 of the
APA if a court is duty-bound to issue mandamus relief when applying § 706(1) of the APA).
177. Id.
178. See infra Part IV.A.2.
179. See Norton v. SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (differentiating “unlawfully withheld”
from “unreasonably delayed” under § 706(1) of the APA).
180. See id. (suggesting that the word “unlawful” is tantamount to a refusal to act on a duty).
181. Cf. id. (suggesting that “unreasonable” is a subjective term).
182. Id. (assuming that the Supreme Court had good reason for differentiating “unlawfully
withheld” from “unreasonably delayed” under § 706(1) of the APA).
183. Id.
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In this case, the D.C. district court’s characterization of HHS’s
noncompliance with the statutory deadline as “unreasonably delayed” rather
than “unlawfully withheld” was consistent with SUWA and allowed the
court to use the TRAC balancing test under the discretion afforded by the
contextual reading of Section 706(1).184 Here, the district court’s decision
highlights where the D.C. Circuit again correctly departs from the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits’ practice of precluding a discretionary balancing test.185
The D.C. Circuit’s use of the TRAC test—to determine whether the
agency’s delay is “so egregious” as to warrant judicial intervention—also
more closely aligns with the Supreme Court’s caution that mandamus relief
should be reserved for extraordinary situations.186
B. The District Court Erred in Applying the TRAC Test to Hold That
HHS’s Delay Was Not Sufficiently “Egregious” to Warrant
Mandamus Relief
The district court should have granted mandamus relief based on a
strong showing of the several TRAC factors indicating that HHS’s delay
was sufficiently “egregious.” 187 This Part does not disturb or discredit the
analysis performed by the district court regarding TRAC factors four and
six, which weigh against mandamus relief. 188 This Part does demonstrate,
however, that the factors favoring mandamus relief were sufficient to
outweigh the factors against mandamus relief. 189 Part IV.B.1 asserts that
TRAC factors one and two, relating to the text and purpose of deadline
within the enabling statute, produced a showing sufficient to have
warranted mandamus relief. 190 Part IV.B.2 proposes that TRAC factors
three and five, regarding the consequences of the delay to human health and
welfare, weighed strongly in favor of granting mandamus relief.191
1. Text and Purpose of the Deadline Within the Enabling Statute
The first two TRAC factors, taken together, weigh heavily in favor of
mandamus relief when an agency violates a statutory deadline. 192 In In re
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, the D.C. Circuit determined that

184. See supra notes 169–171 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 72–85.
186. See supra notes 43, 157–171 and accompanying text.
187. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
188. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53–56 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812
F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that TRAC test factors four and six weigh against
mandamus relief).
189. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
190. See infra Part IV.B.1.
191. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
192. See infra Part IV.B.1.
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a violation of a statutory deadline “does not, alone, justify judicial
intervention,” but does serve as the “first and most important” of the TRAC
factors. 193 The D.C. Circuit granted mandamus relief in People’s
Mojahedin by finding that “[t]he specificity and relative brevity of the 180day deadline manifests the Congress’s intent that the Secretary act
promptly” and the Secretary’s twenty-month failure to act “plainly
frustrates the congressional intent and cuts strongly in favor” of granting
mandamus relief. 194 In short, People’s Mojahedin makes clear two points:
first, not all TRAC factors weigh equally and, second, delays of extensive
length necessitate an examination of Congress’ purpose for creating a
statutory deadline. 195
In this case, the district court incorrectly minimized the importance of
the statutory deadline. 196 The district court’s position that the fourth TRAC
factor, relating to agency priorities, “reduce[d] the heft of these first two
factors” demonstrates that the court did not sufficiently emphasize the
importance of the statutory deadline. 197 The statutory deadline in this case,
ninety days, is half that of the deadline in People’s Mojahedin, and the
average delay in this case, approximately two years, is larger than the delay
in People’s Mojahedin. 198 In contrast, the court did not issue mandamus
relief in Barr Labs when the delay was less than a year. 199 The violation of
the statutory deadline at issue here is at least as, if not more, egregious than
in People’s Mojahedin. 200 Accordingly, the district court’s analysis and
conclusion regarding HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory deadline
should have more closely resembled People’s Mojahedin than Barr Labs. 201

193. 680 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Barr Labs Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); then quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
194. Id.
195. See id. (emphasizing that extensive agency delays weigh in favor of mandamus relief).
196. Compare Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 51 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812
F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reducing the importance of the statutory deadline), with In re
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the importance
of the statutory deadline).
197. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 51.
198. See id.; see also Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA), U.S. Dep’t of
Health
&
Human
Services,
(Feb.
7,
2016),
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important_notice_regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html (explaining
that the average processing time for appeals decided in fiscal year 2015 was 547.1 days).
199. See In re Barr Labs, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that an average delay
of 336 days was not sufficient to issue mandamus relief).
200. Compare Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (approximately two-year delay on a ninety-day
deadline), with In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (approximately 600-day delay on a
180-day deadline).
201. See In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (issuing mandamus relief for an average
delay of 600 days); In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74 (denying mandamus relief for an average
delay of 336 days).
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By minimizing the importance of first two TRAC factors, the district
court also declined to follow People’s Mojahedin’s examination of the
purpose of the deadline within the enabling statute. 202 The enabling statute
in this case requires an ALJ to conduct and conclude a hearing within a
ninety-day period. 203 The statute also provides that a party requesting the
hearing may escalate its claim to the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”)
if the ALJ fails to meet the ninety-day deadline. 204 The escalation provision
is critical. 205 In failing to make findings as to the purpose of deadlines
within the statutory scheme, the district court ignored the plausible fact that
Congress drafted the statute with an escalation clause to facilitate speed in
the appeals process. 206 In other words, if the ALJ cannot provide a timely
administrative hearing, Congress assured that appellants could bring their
appeal to another administrative body that can decide the matter quickly. 207
The facts demonstrate that HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory
deadline, like in People’s Mojahedin, “plainly frustrates the congressional
intent.” 208 The chain reaction caused by ALJ delays frustrate the design of
the escalation process within the statute.209 For instance, when ALJs do not
meet their ninety-day deadline, more appellants escalate their claims to the
DAB. 210 The DAB admits that it is “unlikely” that it will “meet the 90-day
timeframe for issuing decisions in most appeals” because of the increased
caseload from ALJ escalations.211 Therefore, HHS cannot currently issue
timely adjudications at either the ninety-day ALJ deadline or the ninety-day
DAB deadline, leaving judicial review in federal court as the only
remaining option for a timely adjudication. 212 In other words, a party can
escalate through both the ALJ and DAB levels and seek judicial review in
federal court in approximately 180 days while the average delay for an ALJ
hearing is nearly 550 days. 213 A rational appellant would certainly choose

202. See In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (examining Congress’s rationale for
instituting a statutory deadline).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2012).
204. Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(A).
205. See In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (acknowledging that deadlines manifest
Congress’s intent).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. OMHA Medicare Appellant Forum, Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals
(“OMHA”) Medicare Appellant Forum, Oct. 29, 2014, Washington, D.C.,
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/files/appellant_forum_presentations.pdf (indicating that escalation from
the ALJs to DAB increased nearly tenfold from 2013 to 2014).
211. Id. at 60.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 198.
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the shorter timeline.214 This scenario plainly violates congressional intent,
as federal courts were not meant to process the bulk of administrative
appeals, especially those that have not received any previous on-the-record
hearings. 215 Consequently, the district court should have issued mandamus
relief based on the severity of the delay and the lack of an adequate remedy
in the escalation process. 216
2. Human Health and Welfare Interest Associated with Hospital
Services
The district court erred in concluding that the human health and
welfare interests at stake “weigh[ed], if at all, only very lightly,” in favor of
mandamus relief. 217 The third and fifth TRAC factors, taken together, more
readily compel a court to issue mandamus relief when the interests
prejudiced by the delay affect human health and welfare.218 The D.C.
Circuit has explained that human health and welfare are at stake when the
consequences pose a serious threat to public health. 219 The D.C. Circuit’s
standard for finding such a serious threat derives from cases in which an
agency delayed in regulating raw milk and when an agency delayed in
issuing label warnings on aspirin products. 220
In this case, the district court erred in its factual findings regarding the
impact of HHS’s delay on health and human welfare. 221 The district court
did not dispute that the ALJ hearing backlog and related reimbursement
delays caused hospitals to “reduce costs, eliminate jobs, forgo services, and
substantially scale back.” 222 The district court found, however, that these
facts insufficiently affected public health and welfare to compel the court to
issue mandamus relief. 223 For example, the district court found “very few
specific services . . . are actually less available to the public as a result of
the delays.” 224 At most, the district court found that the uncertainty of
timely reimbursement forced some rehabilitation facilities party to the suit
214. See supra note 210 (indicating that escalation from the ALJs to DAB increased nearly
tenfold from 2013 to 2014).
215. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012) (designating administrative entities rather than
courts to adjudicate appeals). See also In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 837
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (issuing mandamus relief when the missed statutory deadline plainly frustrated
Congress’s intent).
216. See infra text accompanying notes 217–221.
217. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183,
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also infra Part IV.B.2.
218. Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
219. See supra note 105.
220. See supra note 105.
221. See infra notes 222–232.
222. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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to decline to admit patients with lower extremity joint replacements and
certain debilitated physical conditions. 225 The district court concluded,
however, that the inability to admit certain patients was not sufficiently
comparable to the examples of raw milk or mislabeled aspirin. 226
The district court’s narrow findings of fact overlooked important
statements related to human health and welfare that were included in the
plaintiffs’ pleadings. 227 For example, one plaintiff hospital pled that it has
been unable to purchase basic equipment, such as beds for its Intensive
Care Unit, and has not been able to replace a failing roof in its surgery
department. 228 Additionally, other plaintiff hospitals alleged that they have
postponed necessary upgrades to their electronic health record systems. 229
The plaintiffs also asserted that they cannot pay competitive wages, which
risks losing highly skilled and experienced health care professionals.230 By
declining to address these facts directly, the district court was able to
conclude that the hospital services mentioned in the pleadings posed fewer
“immediate and undisputed dangers” to health and human welfare than did
raw milk or mislabeled aspirin. 231 Given the nature of hospital care,
however, particularly the care of the elderly Medicare population, it is
plausible that a hospital’s inability to purchase beds, repair roofs, update
records systems, or keep its skilled doctors, does present immediate and
undisputed dangers to human health and welfare. 232
Moreover, the district court’s conclusion that interests relating to
human health and welfare should be discounted because “virtually the entire
docket of the agency involves issues of this type” is problematic as a matter
of law in this case. 233 The D.C. Circuit developed this rule, in Sierra Club
v. Thomas, 234 where the court analyzed the health and human welfare TRAC
factor within the context of delays in the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) rulemaking regarding the regulation of strip mine
225. Id.
226. Id. (contrasting the danger to public health cause by certified raw milk in Pub. Citizen v.
Heckler, 62 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1985) and unlabeled aspirin in Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. FDA., 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
227. See infra notes 228–232.
228. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 10, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:14-CV851-JEB), 2014 WL 10093552.
229. Brief by the Fund for Access to Inpatient Rehabilitation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff at 27, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:14-CV-851JEB), 2014 WL 10093552.
230. Id. at 28.
231. See Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 53 (overlooking certain facts from petitioner’s brief); see
also supra note 220.
232. See supra notes 228–231.
233. See Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
234. 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir 1987).
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fugitive emissions. 235 The factual differences between Sierra Club and the
present case highlight the error of comparison.236 For example, unlike the
ninety-day ALJ hearing deadline in American Hospital Association v.
Burwell, the EPA was not under a statutory deadline to issue a rulemaking
in Sierra Club. 237 Additionally, emissions have a relatively remote impact
on human health and welfare compared to the direct impact that
underfunded and understaffed hospitals has on human welfare. 238 Finally,
the application of the Sierra Club principle, tailored to delays in EPA
rulemakings, to HHS, an agency exclusively chartered for health and human
welfare, creates a scenario where nearly every HHS action is immune from
a health and human welfare analysis.239 The absurdity of this result reveals
that the district court should have distinguished Sierra Club from this
case. 240
In summation, the district court’s conclusion that the human health and
welfare interests at stake in American Hospital Association v. Burwell were
insufficient for mandamus relief rested on incomplete findings of fact and
erroneously applied legal principles. 241 The effect of HHS’s delay on the
human health and welfare interests removes any lingering doubt that the
district court should have issued mandamus. 242
C. The Uncertainty of Any Forthcoming Remedy from HHS and
Congress in Addressing the Delay Further Bolsters the Conclusion
for Mandamus Relief
As a matter of public policy, district court’s overreliance on the fourth
TRAC factor underscores the conclusion that mandamus is appropriate. 243
The district court relied on the principle that “mandamus jurisdiction is not
a license to intermeddle, and the Court is loath to horn in on the problemsolving efforts of the other two branches of government.” 244 However, the
uncertainty of any forthcoming remedy from HHS or Congress in

235. Id. at 798.
236. See infra notes 237–239.
237. Cf. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Sierra Club, 828 F.2d at 798) (erroneously
comparing a statutory adjudication deadline to a regulatory rulemaking).
238. Id. (erroneously equating the remote impact of emissions to the more direct impact of
medical care for hospital patients).
239. Id. (erroneously equating the health and human welfare focus of the EPA to that of HHS).
240. See supra notes 237–239.
241. See supra Part IV.B.
242. See supra Part IV.B.
243. See infra Part IV.C. This Part does not attempt to provide solutions to the ALJ Hearing
backlog and the related problems. Such solutions are outside the scope of this Note.
244. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 54–55.
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addressing the delay of Medicare reimbursement hearings bolsters the
argument for mandamus relief. 245
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has demonstrated
that it is unable to meet, or even come relatively close to meeting, the
statutory adjudication deadlines for ALJ appeals under the current
budgetary constraints.246
While ALJs have recently become more
productive, the volume of ALJ appeals has outpaced ALJ decisions since
2008 and has recently exceeded four times the amount of cases that the
ALJs can decide in one year. 247 HHS has offered some solutions, including
standardizing business practices, encouraging mediation, using statistical
sampling, and implementing electronic case processing. 248 These solutions,
however, will not have a significant or immediate impact in curing the ALJ
delays. 249
Even an optimistic view of Congress’s commitment to address the ALJ
adjudication delay brings little comfort to the district court’s decision to
defer to Congress as problem solver. 250 First, both the Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations have approved different bills with different
levels of funding for the ALJ hearings for the fiscal year 2016 budget. 251
Both bills, however, would only increase the level of funding by, at most,
$10 million. 252 Furthermore, these bills must still pass in both the House
and Senate, and the House and Senate must reconcile any differences in
budget negotiations before the President can sign the budget into law.253
Second, in June of 2015, the Senate Finance Committee passed the Audit &
Appeal Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare (“AFIRM”) Act of
2015, an original bill to improve the Medicare audit and appeals process. 254
245. See infra Part IV.C.
246. See generally supra note 210.
247. See generally supra note 210.
248. See generally supra note 210.
249. Amy F. Lerman & Robert E. Wanerman, OMHA’s Second Medicare Appellant Forum
Reveals Some Forward Momentum but No Simple or Quick Solutions for Medicare Administrative
Appeals
Backlog
(Epstein
Becker
Green,
Nov.
6,
2014),
http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/11/HCLS-Client-Alert_OMHA-Second-MedicareAppellant-Forum.pdf.
250. See infra note 251.
REP.
NO.
114-195,
at
111
(2015)
,
251. H.R.
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt195/CRPT-114hrpt195.pdf (providing $87,381,000 for the
Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, which is the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level
and $52,619,000 below the budget request); S. REP. NO. 114-74, at 151 (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/srpt74/CRPT-114srpt74.pdf (providing $97,381,000 for the
Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, which is $10 million more than provided in the fiscal
year 2015 but $42,619,000 below the budget request).
252. Id.
253. Id.
REP.
NO.
114-177,
at
9
(2015),
254. See
also
S.
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.Rpt.114-177.pdf.; Press Release, U.S. Senate
Finance Committee, Hatch, Wyden Praise Committee Passage of the Audit & Appeal Fairness,
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Assuming an expeditious path for AFIRM into law, the majority of its
effects would not take effect until 2017. 255 Notably, these effects do not
include a direct solution to the issue of noncompliance with the ALJ’s
statutory deadline. 256
The undesirable legislative outlook demonstrates bleak hope for HHS
and Congress to address the problem on their own. 257 Moreover, the district
court’s resistance to intervention enacts the warning offered by Justice
Marshall’s concurrence in Heckler:
[R]ecognizing that courts must approach the substantive task of
reviewing such failures [to meet statutory requirements] with
appropriate deference to an agency’s legitimate need to set policy
through the allocation of scarce budgetary and enforcement
resources. . . . [T]he Court’s approach, if taken literally, would
take the courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far
too many cases . . . . 258
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Marshall’s caution in Heckler is most appropriate when the
stakes are high, as in this case. 259 Plaintiffs have essentially lost their
appeal rights, with nearly 2000 appeals, collectively worth more than $10
million, backlogged at the ALJ level. 260 Justice Marshall warned that the
“dangers of agency inaction are too important, too prevalent, and too
multifaceted to . . . mandat[e] that courts cover their eyes and their
reasoning power when asked to review an agency’s failure to act.” 261
Absent mandamus, hospitals will be forced to weather HHS’s extraordinary
delays, without Medicare payments for services that were already furnished
to beneficiaries and to which they are entitled. 262 The danger to health and
safety is real and the scope of the problem is measureable in both
reimbursement dollars and the impact on patients affected by cost
cutting. 263 By noting that Congress is aware of the situation and is in a
position to address the problem, the D.C. district court proclaimed
Integrity,
and
Reforms
in
Medicare
Act
of
2015
(June
3,
2015),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=bc09dd5b-84d6-45e2-ba89c61a40481489.
255. S. REP. NO. 114-177, at 9.
256. Id.
257. See supra notes 250–258 and accompanying text.
258. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 855 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
259. See infra notes 260–263.
260. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 228, at 30.
261. Heckler, 470 U.S. 821 at 854–55 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
262. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183,
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
263. See supra notes 227–232 and accompanying text.
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absolution from a problem it declares it has no business solving. 264 But
after years of delay and no sign of a solution from HHS or Congress, who
better than the district court to champion the cause of those who seek the
relief to which they are entitled? The recent D.C. Circuit remand order
only reinforces the point that the responsibility, indeed, falls squarely with
the district court when adequate and timely remedies are not forthcoming
from the coordinate branches. 265
In failing to issue mandamus relief, the district court succumbed to the
trappings of a strict posture of deference warned against by Justice
Marshall. 266 Justice Marshall reasoned that a court’s deference to an
“agency’s legitimate need to set policy through the allocation of scarce
budgetary and enforcement resources . . . if taken literally, would take the
courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far too many
cases.” 267 American Hospital Association v. Burwell stands as a glaring
example of a case where the court took too literally the charge of deference
to an agency at the expense of providing relief due under the law.

264. See Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 56 (noting that the court is “not in a position to provide
that fix”).
265. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192–94 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see supra Part
IV.C.
266. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 854–55 (Marshall, J., concurring) (warning that a court should
not interpret § 706(1) of the APA too literally at the expense of necessary judicial review and
intervention).
267. Id. at 855.

